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PROBATION RESTRICTIONS IMPACTING 







In State v. Oakley,1 the all-male four-justice2 majority held that 
a probation condition restricting David Oakley's right to have chil­
dren passed constitutional muster. Writing for the all-female, 
three-justice dissent, Justice Bradley of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court sounded a clarion call that the decision made theirs "the only 
court in the country"3 to uphold such limits on a probationer's right 
to procreate. She is nearly correct in her conclusion. Only one 
other reported decision,4 another case involving a male defendant's 
right to procreate, affirms a probation condition limiting a proba­
tioner's right to have children.5 Every other reported decision re­
viewing a restriction on a probationer's right to have children, 
primarily involving female probationers, has struck down the 
condition.6 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I 
wish to thank Professors Richard Cole, Bruce Miller, James Gordon, Valorie Vojdik, 
Jaminson Colburn, Samuel Stonefield, Leora Harpaz, Taylor Flynn, and Dean Arthur 
Gaudio for review or discussion of this essay. I also wish to thank the Western New 
England Law Review staff for assistance with editing and cite-checking. 
1. 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001). 
2. While arguably not always relevant, the gendered composition of the majority 
and dissent bears mention in light of the gender-based analysis herein. 
3. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216. 
4. State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (after violating his proba­
tion for criminal mistreatment of a child, the defendant was prohibited from fathering 
more children until he completed counseling). 
5. Two other decisions affirm a less strict restriction relating to procreation. See 
State v. Talty, 2003 WL 21396835, at *2, 7-9 (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 2003) (citing 
Oakley) (upholding (community control condition that defendant convicted of non-sup­
port of dependents take reasonable steps to avoid conceiving another child); Krebs v. 
Schwartz, 568 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (probation condition requiring proba­
tioner "to discuss and obtain permission from probation agent" before beginning sexual 
relationship was held constitutional). 
6. See, e.g., People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (hold­
ing "no pregnancy condition ... improper because it is impermissibly overbroad."); 
People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting the existence of 
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Concerned about this departure from the national majority po­
sition, Justice Bradley criticizes the majority for its application of a 
reasonableness test to the probation condition and advocates vocif­
erously for heightened scrutiny of probation conditions that im­
pinge on fundamental rights.7 Based on a review of the analysis in 
comparable cases across the country, her focus is misplaced. De­
spite Oakley's departure in outcome from the dominant national 
trend, the majority's analysis is all but doctrinally routine with re­
spect to the degree of scrutiny it affords the probation condition. 
Academics may argue about the right standard for evaluating 
the constitutionality of probation conditions as a normative matter.8 
However, there is little question about the standard that courts do 
apply in reviewing restrictions on liberty interests of probationers. 
As articulated by the Oakley majority, "conditions of probation 
may impinge upon constitutional rights as long as they are not 
overly broad and are reasonably related to the person's rehabilita­
tion."9 In other words, while generally there must be a rational re­
lationship between the restriction and the underlying criminal act, 
there is less scrutiny of the restriction of a liberty interest for a pro­
bationer than there is for a non-probationer.Io This is in recogni­
tion of the fact that if the probationer were not on probation he or 
"alternative restrictions less subversive of appellant's fundamental right to procreate."); 
Trammel v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (order to refrain from be­
coming pregnant held to serve "no rehabilitative purpose whatsoever."). 
7. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 217. 
8. See generally Tracy Ballard, The Norplant Condition: One Step Forward or Two 
Steps Back?, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 139, 166 (1993) (advocating for strict scrutiny 
analysis of probation condition mandating use of long-term contraception that sup­
presses ovulation in light of its promise "to have a severely disparate impact on women 
of color."); Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some 
Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 75, 161 (2000) (advocating for appellate courts to "abandon the incredibly defer­
ential abuse of discretion standard ...."); Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day 
Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
1357, 1359 (1989) (reasoning that "punitive probation conditions" should merit "an 
eighth amendment analysis."); Phaedra Athena O'Hara Kelly, Comment, The Ideology 
of Shame: An Analysis of First Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scar­
let Letter Probation Conditions,77 N.C. L. REV. 783, 786 (1999) (proposing "a standard 
that requires the trial courts to explain their reasons for imposing special probation 
conditions and that requires reviewing courts to consider the probationer's liberty inter­
est in their analysis of probate conditions."); Jaimy M. Levine, Comment, "Join the 
Sierra Club!": Imposition of Ideology as a Condition of Probation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 
1841, 1848 (1994) (suggesting "heightened constitutional scrutiny" for "probation con­
ditions that impose an ideology ...."). 
9. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 210 (citing Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109 (1976». 
10. As the Oakley majority explained, "a convicted felon does not stand in the 
same position as someone who has not been convicted of a crime." Id. at 210. In sup­
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she would be incarcerated, a near total curtailment of the individ­
ual's liberty interest. 
This essay makes a modest point about the Oakley decision 
which is simply the case's jurisprudential ordinariness. The major­
ity accurately identifies the established test for evaluating the con­
stitutionality of probation restrictions and applies it. In an 
abundance of caution, the majority goes even further in analyzing 
the constitutionality of the condition and supporting the outcome in 
the case. In addition to applying the test it articulates as the con­
trolling one, the majority also applies the heightened scrutiny test 
supported by the dissent. Applying that test, the majority con­
cludes that the "condition is narrowly tailored to serve the State's 
compelling interest of having parents support their children."ll. 
Recognizing that it is the court's ultimate duty to engage in 
balancing, it is hard to fault the majority for the outcome. Despite 
that cold conclusion, this author shares the dissent's concern about 
the slippery slope created by the Oakley decision as well as the 
challenges it creates for marginalized groups.l2 Nevertheless, this 
author also acknowledges that slippery slopes can slope both ways 
depending on the placement of the fulcrum.13 In other words, the 
dissent is rightfully concerned that this decision allows courts to ef­
fectively curtail the fundamental right of poor, convicted persons to 
have children14 and, ultimately, threatens to make one's ability to 
support one's children a limit on having additional children.1s Of 
port of this observation, the court explained, convicted felons may lawfully be deprived 
their right to vote even after serving a full sentence. Id. at 210 n.26. 
11. Id. at 212. 
12. Id. at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
13. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1026, 1030 (2003) (remarking on cases "where the slope seems slippery both 
ways .....") 
14. This essay says little about the jurisprudence establishing the fundamental 
right at issue, the right to have children, because it is so firmly established. See Skinner 
v. Oklahoma ex reI. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,536 (1942) (calling "the right to have 
offspring" ... "a right ... basic to the perpetuation of a race ..."); Matter of Guardian­
ship of Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881, 892 (Wis. 1981) (describing "the right to procreate" 
as "a protected, fundamental personal decisional choice ...."). Other authors have 
addressed the dissent's concern about the slippery slope to eradicating this right, partic­
ularly in the context of welfare legislation. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth 
Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional 
Reproductive Controls, 38 How. L.J. 473,474-86 (1995) (arguing Norplant welfare laws 
infringe the constitutional right to procreate); Laurence C. Nolan, The Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine and Mandating Norplant for Women on Welfare Discourse, 3 AM. 
U. J. GENDER & L. 15, 22 (1994) (asserting that "[1]egislation that links Norplant to 
welfare benefits infringes upon the protected fundamental rights of mothers."). 
15. While there are some who might support this position as a policy matter, it 
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course, the slippery slope traversed in the other direction and its 
effect on existing children is the majority's concern. The majority is 
on record as emphatically rejecting, "the novel idea that Oakley has 
an absolute right to refuse to support his current nine children and 
any future children that he procreates ...."16 The majority sees 
David Oakley's constitutional rights as appropriately infringed in 
the interest of protecting children. 
Notwithstanding the dissent's alarm over the ramifications of 
the decision for every citizen of Wisconsin (and presumably every 
citizen of this country), "man or woman, rich or poor,"17 in the end, 
the majority opinion situates itself securely within established pro­
bation jurisprudence. As a result, the case should either cause no 
alarm or, in the alternative, should turn a spotlight on the incorrect­
ness of courts' analytical approach to evaluating probation condi­
tions rather than on the degree of scrutiny applied. 
In order to advance some thinking on the question of the ap­
propriate approach to evaluating the constitutionality of probation 
conditions, Section I unpacks the disagreement (or lack of it) be­
tween the majority and the dissent. This sets up the groundwork 
for a discussion in Section II that compares the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court's approach to that of other courts in cases involving, in some 
way, decisions limiting a probationer's right to have children. Sec­
tion II concludes that regardless of what constitutional standard or 
degree of scrutiny courts apply, cases can (and do) go both ways 
with respect to upholding or striking down probation restrictions on 
fundamental rights. However, the dominant trend despite the 
Oakley decision has been to strike down procreation restrictions. 
Section III details an alternative approach to the evaluation of pro­
bation conditions under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
that was revitalized in the 2001 Supreme Court term and argues 
that, in the end, probationers should have at least the same protec­
tions for constitutional rights as do incarcerated felons. Accord­
ingly, no absolute curtailment of probationers' procreation rights, 
which the Oakley restriction is, should survive constitutional 
review. 
clearly violates established constitutional law. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 
388 (1978) (finding that inability to pay child support may not compromise fundamental 
right). 
16. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208. 
17. Id. at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
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I. THE MAJORITY AND DISSENT VEHEMENTLY DISAGREE-OR 
Do THEY? 
The rhetoric adopted by both the majority and dissent suggests 
that they vehemently disagree with one another about the approach 
to reviewing the probation condition at issue in the case. However, 
a closer look at each side's analysis reveals that the more serious 
disagreement is in the outcome, not in the approach. 
A. The Majority Approach 
Justice Wilcox wrote the decision for the court. After detailing 
the facts of the case, including Oakley's having nine children with 
four different women and his subsequent refusal to provide support 
for them,18 Justice Wilcox zeroes in on the constitutional issue. As 
he articulates it, the issue is one of the constitutionality of a condi­
tion of probation19 that prohibits Oakley from fathering any addi­
tional children "unless he shows that he can support that child and 
his current children. "20 
Before addressing the constitutional standard for reviewing 
probation conditions, Justice Wilcox cites the probation statute and 
explains a justification for its use. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
has said, "[t]he theory of the probation statute is to rehabilitate the 
defendant and protect society without placing the defendant in 
prison."21 Picking up on the two-part concern of the statute, reha­
bilitation and protection of society, the majority focuses on the role 
of the probation-issuing judge. "[W]hen a judge allows a convicted 
individual to escape a prison sentence and enjoy the relative free­
dom of probation, he or she must take reasonable judicial measures 
to protect society and potential victims from future wrongdoing. "22 
While such judges are admonished against imposing probation con­
ditions that reflect the judge's personal idiosyncrasies,23 they should 
use their discretion in order to set probation conditions that further 
the dual purposes of the statute. This exercise of discretion ac­
18. The facts of this case have been addressed in detail in other articles in this 
Symposium and, while interesting, are not as relevant to this essay. See Taylor Flynn, 
Introduction: What Does Oakley Tell Us About the Failures of Constitutional Decision­
Making?, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2004); David Papke, State v. Oakley, Deadbeat 
Dads, and American Poverty, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 9, 10-16 (2004). 
19. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203 (stating the basis of Oakley's challenge). 
20. Id. at 201. 
21. Id. at 205 (citing State v. Gray, 590 N.W.2d 918, 933 (Wis. 1999». 
22. Id. at 206. 
23. Id. at 206 n.20 (citing Horwitz, supra note 8; Brilliant, supra note 8 (noting 
some of the more bizarre probation conditions judges have imposed». 
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know ledges an inconsistency of probation conditions that may be 
imposed by different judges, even for probationers charged with 
similar crimes based on comparable sets of facts. 
Having laid the factual predicates for the case and identified 
the legal issues, Justice Wilcox addresses Oakley's contention that 
because the probation restriction impinges on the fundamental 
right to procreate it warrants strict scrutiny.24 At this point, Justice 
Wilcox's analysis takes an interesting turn that is somewhat hard to 
follow. He concedes, as he must, that procreation is a fundamental 
right and ordinarily its infringement by the government would be 
subject to strict scrutiny.25 However, before distinguishing Oakley, 
a convicted felon, from an ordinary person, as he does later in the 
opinion,26 he grants Oakley his position and seems to apply strict 
scrutiny by noting Oakley's concession that the State's interest in 
requiring parents to support their children is a compelling oneP 
Justice Wilcox then hones in on Oakley's argument which seems to 
be that, although the government identifies a compelling interest in 
support of the restriction, the condition is not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored because it categorically denies Oakley the right to procre­
ate. Oakley argues that the condition categorically denies him the 
right to procreate because he "'probably never will have the ability 
to support his children. "28 
Interestingly, rather than returning to the rational relationship 
standard Justice Wilcox later determines applicable, he instead con­
cedes that "Oakley'S argument might well carry the day if he had 
not intentionally refused to pay child support ...."29 What Justice 
Wilcox seems to be saying is that the restriction is narrowly tailored 
because it contains a safety valve - as soon as Oakley "decides"30 to 
provide for his children, the procreation restriction may be lifted. 
By engaging Oakley's argument, Justice Wilcox implies that strict 
24. Id. at 207. 
25. Id. (citing Eberhardy v. Circuit Court for Wood County, 307 N.W.2d 881 
(1981); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942». 
26. Id. at 208 (citing State v. Evans, 252 N.W.2d 664 (Wis. 1977); Von Arx v. 




30. The word here is in quotes to identify that it is the author's and not the 
court's. There is a significant dispute between the majority and dissent about Oakley's 
ability ever to support his children. Regardless of the reality of either side's position, 
the majority focuses on Oakley's willful failure to support, suggesting that he could 
have "decided" to take steps otherwise. 
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scrutiny might apply. But, he explains, even if it does, it is satisfied 
in this case. 
From this position, Justice Wilcox moves to more secure 
ground. Though he engages Oakley's position, he swiftly rejects 
it.31 The majority then shifts its focus to Oakley's position as a con­
victed felon rather than as an ordinary citizen. It compares this 
case to one from Oregon in which an intermediate appellate court 
upheld a similar restriction imposed upon a convicted child 
abuser.32 In that case, "[t]he court rejected the defendant's argu­
ment that strict scrutiny applied to the probation condition at is­
sue."33 The Oakley court does as well. The majority explains that 
incarceration, "by its very nature," deprives prisoners of numerous 
fundamental rights, including the "right to be free from physical 
restraint" and other rights implicated by such a broad scale re­
straint, "such as the right to procreate."34 Therefore, explains the 
court, convicted felons do not stand in the same position as free 
people.35 As a result, the majority determines that the appropriate 
standard of review is that "conditions of probation may impinge 
upon constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and 
are reasonably related to the person's rehabilitation."36 Justice Wil­
cox then speeds through the test, concluding that the condition im­
posed is not overly broad. As suggested earlier in the decision, 
Oakley's fundamental right to procreate is not extinguished.37 He 
can procreate, if he chooses, as soon as he makes "efforts" to sup­
port his children.38 
Justice Wilcox next addresses the relationship between the 
condition and an effort to rehabilitate Oakley. Justice Wilcox ex­
plains that any alternative, such as allowing Oakley to have addi­
tional children, would further victimize his existing children (and 
31. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208 n.23 (holding "that probation conditions-like 
prison regulations-are not subject to strict scrutiny analysis .... "). 
32. Id. at 208 (citing State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)). 
33. Id. at 209. 
34. Id. at 210-12 (elaborating on all fundamental rights). 
35. Id. at 210. 
36. Id. (citing Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109, 111 (Wis. 1976)). 
37. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
38. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 212. There is a serious discrepancy here between the 
court's language, which states that Oakley need only demonstrate that he is "making 
efforts" to support his children and the language of the probation condition that re­
quires him to "support his present and any future children." !d. (This discrepancy 
seems to highlight the court's earlier suggestion that the reason the condition is nar­
rowly tailored is because of the perceived safety valve-Oakley's choice to pay 
support.) 
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any future ones) and detract from efforts to conform Oakley's con­
duct to a lawful obligation to support his children.39 Oddly, though 
he rejected a strict scrutiny test, Justice Wilcox speaks of the restric­
tion as being "narrowly tailored to serve the State's compelling in­
terest"40 in rehabilitation even as he applies the reasonable 
relationship test he has espoused. 
In the end, Justice Wilcox seems to leave no real room for dis­
pute about the analysis of this case, at least as to outcome.41 Even 
if one disagrees with the test being applied, a test of strictest scru­
tiny does not change the result of the balancing in the majority's 
view. Justice Wilcox asserts a low-level scrutiny test for probation 
conditions, but, in an abundance of caution, also applies a high level 
scrutiny.42 He demonstrates that regardless of which test applies, in 
the end, the probation restriction survives.43 
Before analyzing the dissent's position, it bears mentioning 
that the majority opinion is followed by two concurring opinions. 
Closer scrutiny of the concurrences is warranted because it further 
reveals that the real disagreement between the two sides is the out­
come and not the constitutional approach. Neither concurrence 
takes issue with Justice Wilcox' articulation of the appropriate de­
gree of scrutiny imposed on probation conditions. In fact, Justice 
Crooks' concurrence in part states his rejection of the strict scrutiny 
standard: "[t]he appropriate test is not the strict scrutiny test ...."44 
Interestingly, though, the rest of his concurrence focuses on the 
compelling interest behind the probation restriction. As Justice 
Crooks explains, "Oakley's nine children, rather than Oakley him­
self, are the real victims in this case."45 
Justice Bablitch's concurrence picks up the second part of a 
strict scrutiny test: whether the restriction is narrowly tailored to 
the governmental interest. Because he joined the court's articula­
tion of the appropriate constitutional standard of review, Justice 
Bablitch ignores the question of what scrutiny applies and focuses 
on the factual difficulties presented by the case.46 He restates that 
there is a compelling governmental interest in preventing the harm 
39. Id. at 213. 
40. [d. at 212. 
41. Id. at 208-14. 
42. Id. at 207 (noting that "[wJhile the condition here survives strict scrutiny," it is 
"not subject to strict scrutiny analysis ...."). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 215 (Crooks, J., concurring). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 214 (Bablitch, J., concurring). 
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to children who cannot otherwise protect themselves.47 Ultimately, 
despite his unhappiness with the results of the case, Justice Bab­
litch's concurrence emphasizes the dissent's failure "to advance any 
realistic alternative solution to what they concede is a compelling 
state interest. "48 According to Justice Bablitch, the probation re­
striction is narrowly tailored to the governmental interest because 
no other restriction can be articulated which would achieve the 
same degree of protection for Oakley's born, and potential unborn, 
children. 
In the end, it does not matter to the majority, including the 
authors of the concurring opinions, which test applies. Under ei­
ther a reasonable relationship or strict scrutiny test, the probation 
condition survives. Although the majority spends a significant por­
tion of the opinion criticizing the dissent's analysis of the applicable 
standard, it is legal wrangling without a difference.49 The outcome, 
for the majority, is the same. 
B. The Dissents 
There are two dissenting opinions. One was written by Justice 
Bradley and joined by Justices Abrahamson and Sykes. The other 
was written by Justice Sykes and joined by Justices Abrahamson 
and Bradley. It is particularly notable that Justices Bradley and 
Sikes joined each other's dissent though each seem to state a differ­
ent standard of review for the probation condition. This proves one 
point of this essay: regardless of the standard articulated, the real 
disagreement between the majority and the dissent is the outcome, 
not the degree of scrutiny. 
Justice Bradley begins her dissent with blazing rhetoric. She 
clearly takes offense at the majority's seeming disregard for the fun­
damental right at issue in the case, the right to have children. She is 
seriously alarmed that this type of case might set a precedent for 
the curtailment of poor people's right to procreate. And, finally, 
she emphasizes that though she has a substantive disagreement with 
the majority, she is no less concerned than the four majority justices 
about the protection of children.50 
47. Id. at 215. 
48. Id. See also Richard P. Cole, Liberation and Empowerment: A Jubilean Alter­
native for Wisconsin v. Oakley, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 27, 27-28 (2004) (discussing 
"Justice Bablitch's lamentation"). 
49. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 205 n.18, 297-09 nn. 22-24 (using firm language to 
describe the majority's view of the dissenting opinions). 
50. Id. at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (indicating her concern "about children 
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However, a technical look at Justice Bradley's opinion reveals 
an interesting twist to the applicable scrutiny for probation condi­
tions. She forthrightly states at the outset of her opinion that 
"[b ]ecause the right implicated by the condition of probation in this 
case is one that is central to the concept of fundamental liberty, the 
state action infringing upon that right is subject to heightened scru­
tiny."51 Because she has departed from the language of established 
Wisconsin precedent on just this issue, Justice Bradley must explain 
how she arrives at such a conclusion. 
Justice Bradley examines the same language the majority cites 
from the Edwards decision to illustrate the effect that probation 
conditions may not be "overly broad" and must be "reasonably re­
lated" to a probationer's rehabilitation.52 Then she analyzes the ap­
propriate standard of review for governmental conditions on liberty 
interests in non-probation contexts. All would concede that, in 
such a context, state action infringing on a fundamental liberty in­
terest can be justified only by a compelling state interest and where 
"narrowly drawn" to protect only those legitimate state interests at 
stake.53 Her next move is slightly tricky. At this point, Justice 
Bradley equates a "means-ends inquiry" which is "not overly 
broad" with one which must be "narrowly drawn."54 She concludes 
"the essence of [ either] inquiry is the same. "55 
Unsurprisingly, the rest of her opinion focuses on the applica­
tion of the relevant test; it concludes that the restriction is essen­
tially a wholesale prohibition on Oakley's right to have children, 
despite the safety valve the majority discussed.56 In analyzing 
whether the restriction is narrowly tailored to the government's in­
terest in protecting children, Justice Bradley looks at alternatives 
available to the state to achieve the same protective outcomes. She 
explains that if that is government's true concern (as all of the court 
seems to concede) then Wisconsin has a panoply of statutes availa­
ble to ensure that goal. Included within the state's arsenal are wage 
assignment and garnishment, liens on personal property, and civil 
raised in poverty," Justice Bradley articulates that she too is "troubled by the societal 
problem caused by 'deadbeat' parents ...."). 
51. Jd. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
52. Jd. (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 109, 111 
(Wis. 1976». 
53. Jd. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'!, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977». 
54. Jd. at 217. 
55. Jd. 
56. Jd. at 217-18 (noting the circuit court's recognition of Oakley's inability to 
fulfill the financial requirements of the condition). 
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contempt.57 Justice Bradley explains that at sentencing, Oakley 
presented numerous alternative means of advancing the interests of 
his children, including conditioning probation on his maintaining 
two full-time jobs, supporting his children with the proceeds, taking 
parenting classes, and undergoing drug and alcohol counseling.58 In 
the end, because there are less draconian means of achieving the 
same ends, Justice Bradley finds the probation restriction cannot 
survive constitutional scrutiny. 59 
Justice Sykes basically agrees, as she must, given that she 
joined Justice Bradley's opinion. She writes separately, it seems, to 
underscore the point and identify several other means of securing 
the same protections for Oakley's children that may be obtained 
from the more restrictive probation condition. Doctrinally, how­
ever, Justice Sykes' analysis is closer to that of the majority. She 
agrees with the majority on the relevant degree of scrutiny of pro­
bation conditions, and that infringements on a probationer's consti­
tutional rights are "evaluated differently" from others.60 She 
concedes that "conditions of probation may impinge upon constitu­
tional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably 
related to [the probationer's] rehabilitation."61 She does not ma­
nipulate language to convert this into a strict scrutiny standard as 
does Justice Bradley. Rather, she finds that the court-ordered pro­
creation restriction is overly broad, cites many of the reasons 
pointed to by Justice Bradley, and adds a few of her own. Justice 
Sykes explains that in addition to being required to maintain two 
jobs and face property liens, Oakley could have his tax refunds in­
tercepted and redirected to child support and be criminally prose­
cuted for any future failure to pay.62 
Just as we learned from the three majority opinions, what we 
learn from the interplay of these two dissenting justices is that it 
does not matter which level of scrutiny applies. In the majority 
view, regardless of the applicable level of scrutiny, the probation 
57. !d. at 218 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-90 (1978) (holding 
unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute prohibiting marriage until both people had estab­
lished that their child support obligations had been met». 
58. Id. at 218 n.3. According to Justice Bradley, "at sentencing Oakley requested 
an opportunity to maintain full employment, provide for his children, and make serious 
payments towards his child support arrearages." Id. 
59. Id. at 219. 
60. !d. at 221 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
61. [d. (quoting Edwards v. State, 246 N.W. 2d 109 (Wis. 1976». 
62. Id. at 222. 
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condition stands. In the dissent's view, regardless of the applicable 
level of scrutiny, the probation condition fails. 
II. SITUATING OAKLEY IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT 
If trends are defined by case outcomes, the Oakley decision 
defies the overwhelmingly dominant trend in cases involving proba­
tion restrictions on procreation. Of all reported cases challenging 
procreation restrictions in a probation context, only one other deci­
sion affirming the restrictions exists.63 In the case of State v. 
Kline,64 an Oregon intermediate appellate court upheld a probation 
restriction imposed upon a defendant convicted of criminally mis­
treating a child until he completed drug and anger management 
counseling.65 That case, upon which the Oakley majority heavily 
relied in support of its application of rational basis review, is, as 
characterized by the dissent, "a single appellate court case from the 
state of Oregon ...."66 
A. 	 The National Precedent Supports a Rule Striking Probation 
Restrictions on Procreation 
In at least eleven other reported cases, courts held procreation 
restrictions to be void as inconsistent with constitutional rights of 
privacy guaranteed by state and federal constitutions.67 An analysis 
63. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
64. 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
65. Id. at 699. 
66. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 n.4 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
67. See U.S. v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992) (procreation restriction 
imposed on defendant convicted of heroin possession invalid); People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (condition that defendant convicted for heroin 
possession not become pregnant during probation invalid); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. 
Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (procreation restriction imposed on defendant con­
victed of child endangerment overly broad where less restrictive means existed to pro­
vide safety for children); People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1967) (probation restriction that defendant convicted of robbery not become pregnant 
unless married found void); Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1988) (condition that defendant convicted of grand theft and battery not become preg­
nant during probation unless married invalid); Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (condition prohibiting defendant from fathering a child not 
reasonably related to crime of child abuse where other less restrictive means existed to 
protect future children); People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("no­
pregnancy" condition for defendant convicted of battery of a two-month-old child 
struck); Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (condition 
prohibiting defendant convicted of child neglect from becoming pregnant while on pro­
bation violated right of privacy); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1989) (probation condition that defendant convicted of child endangerment refrain 
from getting pregnant violated right to privacy); State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952, 953 
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of these opinions reveals little about the majority jurisprudential 
position as to the degree of scrutiny applicable to probation restric­
tions. As one commentator has said, "[t]he myriad of tests applied 
is nothing short of a 'chaotic hodgepodge."'68 Moreover, there is 
not even any textual support in Kline itself for the position the 
Oakley majority takes as to the applicable degree of scrutiny. The 
only conclusion to be drawn from the reported cases is that in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, courts strike down probation re­
strictions against procreation. One can derive no categorical rule 
either as to the applicability of heightened review for probation 
conditions or how good a predictor heightened review is as to case 
outcome.69 
Ignoring these obvious conclusions to be drawn from the re­
ported cases, the Oakley majority, with little or no empirical sup­
port, derives an alternative meaning. The majority believes the 
trend reflects the "lack of mettle" that criminal defendants have for 
challenging probation restrictions given the "more punitive alterna­
tive" they face to probation-incarceration.70 Neither the dissent 
nor this author is persuaded by the majority's conclusion. 
The majority concludes that "the particular condition at issue 
here," a prohibition against the defendant having more children, is 
reserved for "the most egregious circumstances."71 A comparison 
between Oakley, Kline, and those identified as part of the dominant 
trend helps shed some light on the relative egregiousness of this 
case as compared to others in which procreation restrictions have 
been struck. In doing so, it reveals no direct correlation between 
egregiousness and affirmation of probation conditions restrictive of 
procreative ability. Such a comparison is also helpful in underscor­
ing that the degree of scrutiny applied by courts is immaterial to the 
outcome; and, the Justices' disagreement about the applicable level 
of scrutiny in Oakley notwithstanding, the only assistance prece­
dent provides in this area is the revelation of a majority position as 
(La. Ct. App. 1986) (restriction that convicted forgery defendant may not "give birth to 
any children outside of wedlock" during two year probationary period not reasonably 
related to curtailing defendant's criminality); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1338 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (probation restriction that defendant who pled guilty to charge of 
child abuse not have a child for five year period held unconstitutional). 
68. Devon A. Corneal, Comment, Limiting the Right to Procreate: State v.Oakley 
and the Need for Strict Scrutiny of Probation Conditions, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 447, 
464 (2003) (citation omitted). 
69. See infra Part I1.c. 
70. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 209 n.24. 
71. Id. 
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to outcome, not analysis.72 
The factual backdrop grounding the comparison is, of course, 
Oakley itself. Recall that Oakley was charged with violating a Wis­
consin statute that makes it a felony to refuse to support one's chil­
dren. In response to the crisis children face as a result of non­
custodial parents' refusal to pay child support, Wisconsin passed a 
law imposing severe criminal sanctions on so-called "deadbeat par­
ents."73 Section 939.50(3)(e) makes it a class E felony for any per­
son who "intentionally fails for 120 or more consecutive days to 
provide spousal, grandchild or child support which the person 
knows or reasonably should know the person is legally obligated to 
provide ...." The sentence for violation of the provision is a fine 
not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment of up to two years, or both. 
In the case of intentional refusal to pay, imprisonment can be for up 
to five years,?4 
B. The Case for Upholding Restrictions on Procreation 
The only other case in which a probation restriction on procre­
ation was upheld involved a father convicted of serious physical 
abuse of his children.75 The facts of the case are easily character­
ized as "egregious." The defendant in the case, Tad Kline, regularly 
abused his son until his parental rights were eventually terminated. 
After the termination of his parental rights to his son, Kline abused 
72. This conclusion should not be surprising given a trend in federal and state 
constitutional jurisprudence away from an older presumption that the degree of scru­
tiny is outcome determinative. For example, it used to be presumed that nearly without 
exception, strict scrutiny meant a law based on governmental classification could not 
survive and that rational (or reasonable) basis scrutiny meant doom for a challenge to a 
law that reflected a particular classification. Recent case law suggests otherwise. See 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (race-based admissions criterion survive strict 
scrutiny); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking sodomy laws without explicit 
mention of fundamental right or strict scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 
(striking a sexual orientation classification despite no mention of strict scrutiny); Good­
ridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (a state-level decision deter­
mining that rational basis means real scrutiny). An in-depth discussion of this recent 
jurisprudential shift is beyond the scope of this essay but has been taken up insightfully 
elsewhere. Compare Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,8 (1972) 
(characterizing the Warren Court's strict scrutiny as "'strict' in theory and fatal in 
fact ..."), with Libby Huskey, Case Note, Constitutional Law-Affirmative Action in 
Higher Education-Strict in Theory, Intermediate in Fact? Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. 
Ct. 2325 (2003), 4 WYOMING L. REv. 439, 442 (2004) (describing the "weakening [of] 
the strict scrutiny test. "). 
73. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d. at 203. 
74. WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3)(e) (1999-2000). 
75. See State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
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a daughter later born to him and his wife. His abuse of his daughter 
resulted in a spiral fracture to her leg as well as bruising to her chest 
and back when she was just eleven months 01d.76 Kline testified 
that he had harmed his daughter because he did not know his own 
strength and stated that his conduct resulted from the fact that "ba­
bies are so hard to understand. "77 He was convicted of criminal 
mistreatment of children and, as a condition of his probation, re­
quired to complete a drug and anger management program.78 As a 
further condition of probation, the court required him to obtain 
written approval of having met these underlying requirements 
before fathering any additional children.79 
Kline challenged the restriction on his procreative ability as vi­
olative of his fundamental right to procreate.80 The Oregon court 
disagreed. Confirming the analysis of the trial court, the appeals 
court explained that in light of the defendant's background and the 
appropriate interest in the safety of any children the defendant 
might conceive in the future, the condition could withstand consti­
tutional scrutiny.81 In so holding, the court emphasized that the re­
striction was not a total ban because it could be modified or 
eliminated simply on the defendant's demonstration that he had 
completed treatment. On balance, the court said the "condition 
provides potential victims with protection from future injury and 
interferes with defendant's fundamental rights to a permissible 
degree."82 
Interestingly, the Oakley court focuses on Kline to determine 
the degree of scrutiny to be applied even though the Kline decision 
reveals very little as to the degree of scrutiny imposed. The deci­
sion reflects that Kline argued for strict scrutiny, conceding that the 
state interest in protecting children is compelling, but contesting 
that the infringement was not "narrowly tailored to achieve the 
state's legitimate goals."83 The Oakley court states that the Kline 
court "rejected the defendant's argument that strict scrutiny ap­
plied ...."84 Yet, a search of the Kline decision reveals no clear 
76. Id. at 698-99. 
77. Id. at 699. 
78. Id. at 698. 





84. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 209 (Wis. 2001). 
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rejection of the defendant's argument as to anything except 
outcome. 
While the Kline court did say it disagreed with the defendant's 
position, it is not clear that the point it disagreed with is the applica­
ble level of scrutiny. The Kline court disagreed with defendant's 
argument that "the court was required to perform a less restrictive 
means analysis before imposing the condition, that it failed to do so, 
and that the record does not support the imposition of such a condi­
tion."85 The analysis that follows the rejection of the defendant's 
position does not reveal whether the court disagreed that it was re­
quired to perform a less restrictive means analysis (which would be 
required to support the Oakley majority's characterization of the 
Kline decision), whether the court disagreed that the lower court 
failed to do the less restrictive means analysis, or whether the court 
disagreed that the record did not support imposition of the condi­
tion. In other words, the analysis does not reveal whether the court 
rejected the defendant's argument for strict scrutiny, or whether it 
accepted it but concluded that the probation condition passed con­
stitutional muster even under that heightened standard. In sum, 
there is no way to determine from its language what degree of scru­
tiny the Kline court imposed.86 In the end, as with the Oakley case, 
it does not matter. The outcome in both cases could be supported 
by application of either a strict scrutiny or reasonable basis test. 
C. The Case Against Upholding Restrictions on Procreation 
Obviously, the Kline facts are egregious. And, if egregiousness 
of facts were the test for reviewing procreation restrictions, one 
could understand how that might distinguish outcomes in Kline and 
the case of People v. Zaring,87 for example, in which a California 
court struck a procreation restriction imposed on a heroin abuser. 
However, cases striking procreation restrictions in the probation 
context are not without egregious facts comparable to those present 
in Kline. Admitting that there is no precise egregiousness measure, 
85. Kline, 963 P.2d at 699. 
86. Indeed, the one citation the Kline court cited as controlling supports Defen­
dant's claim for heightened scrutiny. Id. (citing State v. Martin, 580 P.2d 536, 540 (Or. 
1978) ("when fundamental right is involved, sentencing court has less discretion to im­
pose conditions in conflict with the right")). 
87. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding "no pregnancy condi­
tion ... improper because it is impermissibly overbroad."). 
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it is nonetheless hard to argue that the facts of People v. Pointer88 
are not similarly egregious as those in KLine. Pointer involved a 
challenge to a probation restriction waged by a mother of two in­
fant children who was convicted of felony endangerment. Against 
the advice of her physician and over the objections of one of the 
children's father, Ruby Pointer imposed a strict macrobiotic diet re­
gime on her children. Over time, the children suffered severe phys­
ical consequences as a result of the food restrictions.89 When 
Pointer finally brought one of her children to a doctor, he was diag­
nosed as "emaciated, semi-comatose, and in a state of shock, was 
dying and in need of immediate hospitalization."90 Pointer re­
sponded, in effect, that she would think about it. She "resisted hos­
pitalization because she felt [her son] might intravenously be fed 
'preservatives' and suffer a rash."91 The doctor who had first diag­
nosed her son contacted officials who ordered the child hospitalized 
immediately. Even during her son's hospitalization, Pointer contin­
ued to feed him macrobiotic food despite her doctor's warnings not 
to do so. She also continued to breastfeed her son after being told 
not to because her milk contained dangerously high levels of so­
dium for the child.92 
Once discharged from the hospital, Pointer's son was placed in 
a foster home. During an otherwise lawful visit with her son, 
Pointer abducted him and fled to Puerto Rico.93 After her eventual 
arrest in Puerto Rico, she admitted to having abducted her son 
from the foster home. She justified the kidnapping by explaining 
that the foster parent fed her son "eggs and sugar and did not re­
spect his dietary habits."94 She said the child was "getting fat" and 
88. 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting the existence of "alterna­
tive restrictions less subversive of appellant's fundamental right to procreate."). 
89. Id. at 359-60. 

A [macrobiotic] diet is followed for spiritual and philosophical reasons. [The 

diet] [a]ims to maintain a balance between foods seen as ying (positive) or 

yang (negative). The diet progresses through ten levels, becoming increasingly 

restrictive. Not all levels are vegetarian, though each level gradually elimi­

nates animal products. The highest levels eliminate fruit and vegetables, even­

tually reaching the level of a brown rice diet. 

The Fruitarian Found., Definitions of Nutrition Systems at www.fruitarian.comiayIDefi­
nitionsNutritionSystems.htm (last visited july. 21, 2004). 
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that "she did not like it. "95 As a result of the diet and Pointer's 
neglect, both of her children suffered physical damage including 
"severe growth retardation and permanent neurological damage."96 
Ruby Pointer was convicted of felony child endangerment under a 
statute similar to the one under which Kline was charged. The 
court sentenced her to five years probation on certain conditions 
including that she not conceive any children within the probation­
ary period.97 
Expressing deep understanding of the trial court's motivation 
behind imposing the condition, nevertheless, the appellate court 
struck the condition.98 After concluding first that the procreation 
restriction was reasonable in light of Pointer's history of child abuse 
and endangerment, the court focused on the range of options avail­
able to protect future unborn children.99 The court concluded that 
"less onerous conditions" could adequately serve the intended pur­
pose of the restriction-protecting the public, including preventing 
injury to any future unborn children.loo The court suggested that 
the defendant could submit to pregnancy testing, and if she became 
pregnant could "be required to follow an intensive prenatal and 
neonatal treatment program monitored by both the probation of­
ficer and by a supervising physician. "101 The court further pointed 
out that any child born during the probationary period could be 
removed from her custody and placed in foster care. Interestingly, 
and arguably inconsistent with the legal conclusion it draws, the 
court pointed out these alternative conditions despite its acknowl­
edgement that "the record fully supports the trial court's belief that 
appellant would continue to adhere to a strict macrobiotic diet de­
spite the dangers it presents to any children she might conceive," 
and the potential for irrevocable harm to a future child despite later 
intervention by the state.102 
Understandably, the Oakley majority ignored the Pointer case 
not just because of its outcome but likely also because of its clear 
articulation of the applicable test for reviewing probation restric­




98. Id. at 366. 
99. Id. at 365. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 364. 
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explained that "[t]he validity of the condition of probation ... must 
first be assessed in terms of its reasonableness,"103 it emphasized 
that satisfaction of a reasonableness standard did not end the in­
quiry. In circumstances where a probation condition "impinges 
upon the exercise of a fundamental right," the court said it "must 
additionally determine whether the condition is impermissibly over­
broad."104 Resolving any ambiguity about the applicable level of 
review resulting from the "impermissibly overbroad" language, the 
court explained that, in light of the infringement the condition 
placed on the defendant's fundamental right to privacy, it must be 
subjected to "special scrutiny" to determine whether it is "entirely 
necessary" to serve "the purposes of rehabilitation and public 
safety."105 In the end, in light of the availability of less restrictive 
alternatives, the Pointer court unanimously reversed the part of the 
trial court's judgment prohibiting procreation as a probation condi­
tion. Although it never used the language of strict scrutiny, leaving 
some question as to the applicable level of inquiry and some room 
for the debate engaged in by the Oakley justices as to the meaning 
of "overly broad," the outcome is without doubt. As long as there 
is any possible alternative (even one that is arguably not failsafe)106 
available for protecting future children, a procreation restriction, no 
matter how egregious the facts of the case, must fall in the eyes of 
the California court. 
A case also involving child abuse, decided nearly seventeen 
years after Pointer, applied a low level of scrutiny yet concurred 
with the outcome in Pointer.107 InState v. Trammell, the defendant 
was charged and convicted of neglect of a dependent following her 
son's death from malnutrition and dehydration.108 The facts of the 
case are, arguably, egregious. Kristie Trammell's son was consum­
ing reasonable amounts of formula but vomiting and suffering from 
severe diarrhea for several months.109 Trammell, without any re­
103. Id. at 363. 
104. Id. at 364. 
105. [d. at 365. This characterization of the level of scrutiny as "special" tracks 
black letter law as defined in LAFAVE, ISRAEL, AND KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
§ 26.9(a), 834. Departing, though, somewhat from the Pointer articulation of special 
scrutiny, LaFave et. al define this special scrutiny to mean a condition is impermissible 
if "the impact upon the probationer's rights is 'substantially greater than is necessary to 
carry out the purposes' of probation." /d. 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102. 
107. State v. Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
108. Id. at 285-86. 
109. [d. at 285. 
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ported explanation, ignored her mother's direction to take the child 
to a hospital for care.110 The record showed that on the day the 
child died, Trammell fed the child once shortly after midnight 
whereupon he vomited most of what he consumed.111 Except for 
peeking into his room the next morning, Trammell failed to either 
check on or feed the child until the next evening.112 By that time, 
he had been dead for hours.113 The facts demonstrate that the child 
had been starving for a long period of time, weighing less than ten 
pounds when he was almost five months 01d.114 At Trammell's sen­
tencing for the charge of neglect, the trial court gave her an eigh­
teen year sentence with eight years to be served on probation.115 
One of the conditions of her probation was that she not become 
pregnant.116 
In reviewing a challenge to the probation condition, the Indi­
ana court addressed the issue as one of first impression in the state 
court. The applicable test articulated by the court for review of 
probation conditions that impinge upon a probationer's exercise of 
a constitutional right was one of reasonableness. In the court's 
words, "the condition must 'have a reasonable relationship to the 
treatment of the accused and the protection of the public.' "117 The 
court created a balancing test for instances when a probation condi­
tion intrudes on a constitutional right by taking into account: "(1) 
the purpose sought to be served by probation; (2) the extent to 
which constitutional rights enjoyed by law abiding citizens should 
be afforded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law 
enforcement."118 Nowhere does the opinion refer to strict scrutiny 
or heightened review. Interestingly, the Trammell court pointed to 
the Pointer analysis without adopting the same degree of scrutiny. 
The Trammell court was persuaded that the restriction had no rela­
tionship to rehabilitation.119 They also felt that the condition would 
give rise to significant enforcement problems by forcing Trammell 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 286. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 287. 
115. Id. at 286. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 288 (quoting Carswell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1999)). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 288-89 (citing People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984)). 
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to choose among concealing the pregnancy, abortion, or incarcera­
tion.120 Based on these two factors, the Indiana Court struck the 
condi tion.121 
In the end, a comparison of cases provides no support for the 
Oakley majority's conclusion either that the applicable test is one of 
reasonableness (or, alternately stated, not strict scrutiny) or egre­
giousness of facts. As demonstrated above, the opinions inter­
changeably talk of reasonableness, special, and strict scrutiny. At 
least one case using the language of reasonableness struck a proba­
tion condition.122 Another court, arguably accepting a defendant's 
argument for strict scrutiny, upheld a similar condition.123 Many of 
the cases involve egregious facts, including demonstrated harm to 
children. Neither the level of scrutiny applied nor the egregious­
ness of facts is predictive of outcomes. Looking to precedent, the 
only reliable prediction that can be made is that, in the vast major­
ity of cases, restrictions on procreation as a condition of probation 
fail. Oakley and Kline are exceptions proving an otherwise hard, 
fast, longstanding rule - a rule as to outcome. 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE RULE-UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
Despite the existence of a hard and fast rule as to outcome, the 
Wisconsin court did not hold to it. The court had an obligation only 
to identify the legal rule applicable to probation conditions and ap­
ply it to the facts before it.124 Whether applying a strict scrutiny, 
special scrutiny, or rational basis test, the court was charged with 
weighing the degree to which the probation restriction impinged on 
a fundamental right against the asserted state interest. It did so du­
tifully. Despite the court's faithfulness to its duty, the dissenting 
justices, and this author, remain unsettled by the outcome-both by 
the serious departure from established case law, at least as to out­
120. Id. at 290 (citing State v. Mosburg, 768P.2d 313 (1989». See Jennifer Martin, 
Coercive Abortions and Criminalizing the Birth of Children: Some Thoughts on the Im­
pact on Women of State v. Oakley, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 65 (2004). 
121. Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 290-91. 
122. Id. at 291. 
123. State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 698-99 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding a condi­
tion that the defendant, convicted of mistreating and physically abusing an infant 
daughter, refrain from fathering additional children before completing anger manage­
ment and drug treatment programs). 
124. Elizabeth F. McCright, Prohibiting Deadbeat Dads From Fathering More 
Children . .. What's Next? The Wisconsin Supreme Court's Decision in State v. Oakley, 
86 MARQ. L. REV. 153,165 (2002). 
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come, and by the implications for poor people's fundamental right 
to have children. 
One other reason the outcome of Oakley is so unsettling is the 
extent to which it conflicts with established law as to the degree of 
protection for the fundamental rights of incarcerated felons, a con­
dition which David Oakley avoided by probation. Oakley stands in 
stark contrast to Turner v. Safley,125 in which the United States Su­
preme Court affirmed that incarcerated prisoners may not be de­
nied the fundamental right to marry.126 In Turner, the Court 
considered a challenge brought by a class of incarcerated prisoners 
to a Missouri regulation that denied prisoners the right to marry 
without the approval of the superintendent which would be ordina­
rily withheld absent a compelling reason.127 In analyzing the re­
striction, the Court acknowledged that the right to marry is a 
fundamental one. It further acknowledged that, "[p ]rison walls do 
not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of 
the Constitution. "128 Granting that, "the problems of prisons in 
America are complex and intractable," and that "courts are ill 
equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison 
administration and reform,"129 the Court identified a unique test 
for balancing the constitutional rights of prisoners with the adminis­
trative exigencies of running a prison. The test it formulated was 
not a standard of heightened scrutiny, but "instead inquired 
whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is 'rea­
sonably related' to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it 
represents an 'exaggerated response' to those concerns."130 Con­
cluding that the marriage restriction in the case was the latter, it 
struck the provision. Notably, in Turner, a restriction on a funda­
mental right fell under a test applying the lowest degree of 
scrutiny.131 
A second fundamental rights case implicated by the Oakley de­
125. 482 u.S. 78 (1987). 
126. Id. at 96. 
127. Id. at 82. While not contained within the regulation, Missouri officials testi­
fied that "generally only a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child would be 
considered a compelling reason." [d. Absent such a scenario, ordinarily, no prisoner 
could marry. Id. 
128. [d. at 84. 
129. [d. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,404-05 (1974». 
130. [d. at 87 
131. [d. at 89 (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 
128 (1977» (noting "such a standard is necessary if 'prison administrators ... , and not 
the courts [are] to make difficult the judgments concerning institutional operations'."). 
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clslOn is that of Zablocki v. Redhaif.132 In Zablocki, the United 
State Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin ban on marriage im­
posed on a father who was not up-to-date on child support where 
his children's caretaker was on public assistance. As the Court ex­
plained, a statutory prohibition on the right to marry could not be 
justified by the state's interest in providing support for children.133 
Together, what Zablocki and Turner mean for David Oakley is that 
he could not have been denied his fundamental right to marry, 
whether he was in jailor not, as a result of his failure to pay child 
support. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising to learn that, as a 
probationer, he could be denied the equally fundamental right of 
procreation. 
The Oakley majority ignores the jurisprudential result of the 
confluence of Turner and Zablocki.134 Instead it takes an alterna­
tive approach to the deprivation of David Oakley'S fundamental 
right to procreate. Justice Wilcox explains that, "[ s limply stated, 
[the trial judge] preserved much of Oakley's liberty by imposing 
probation with conditions rather than the more punitive option of 
imprisonment."135 Put another way, since the trial judge could have 
sentenced Oakley to prison, a near total curtailment of his liberty 
interests, he surely could impose upon him a less restrictive result­
no incarceration but a "voluntary"136 restriction on a liberty inter­
est less severe than that which might have resulted upon incarcera­
tion. Explained this way, an unconstitutional conditions problem 
with the probation condition becomes obvious. 
132. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
133. Id. at 389-90. 
134. The majority does not exactly ignore Zablocki as it does Turner. However, 
it seriously minimizes its significance, noting that while its facts are interesting because 
it was a Wisconsin case, it is inapposite because the Court applied strict scrutiny. State 
v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 208 n.23 (Wis. 2001). 
135. Id. at 212-13. 
136. The word voluntary is in quotes to highlight the fact that in choosing proba­
tion and voluntarily accepting the conditions that attach, convicted defendants have 
very little real choice in the matter. See U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (gov­
ernment argued that probation condition allowing warrantless and limitless searches of 
probationer was voluntary because probationer "had the option of rejecting probation 
and going to prison instead"). See also Sunny A. M. Koshy, Note, The Right of [All] the 
People to Be Secure: Extending Fundamental Fourth Amendment Rights to Probationers 
and Parolees, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 449, 466-68 (1988) (questioning the "voluntariness" of 
probationers' and parolees' choice considering that the alternative is incarceration); PA· 
TRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFES. 
SOR 33-35 (1991) (discussing the voluntary choice of a black South Carolina man to be 
castrated in exchange for a commutation of his prison sentence) (citing State v. Brown, 
326 S.E. 2d 410 (S.c. 1985». 
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Stated broadly, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine "pro­
hibits conditions on allocations in which the government indirectly 
impinges on a protected activity or choice in a way that would be 
unconstitutional if the same result had been achieved through a di­
rect governmental command."137 Although until recently its vital­
ity has been in some question in the area of governmental 
benefits,138 there is no real question about the unconstitutional con­
ditions doctrine's relevance and life in the area of probation condi­
tions. Most recently, the United States Supreme Court considered 
a challenge to a probation condition by which the probationer 
agreed to "[ s ]ubrnit his . . . person, property, place of residence, 
vehicle, [and] personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without 
a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any pro­
bation officer or law enforcement officer."139 As the Court notes, 
the government conceded that the unconstitutional conditions doc­
trine applied.140 As the government explained in its brief, "[u]nder 
the well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the gov­
ernment may not require a person to give up a constitutional right 
in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the govern­
ment ...."141 What the doctrine means for Oakley is that to the 
extent probation may be viewed as a governmental allocation or 
"benefit," the government may not condition it on Oakley's giving 
up his right to procreation, voluntary or otherwise. Viewed this 
way, the condition clearly fails. 
137. There are numerous articulations of the doctrine. This one comes from Lynn 
A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Condi­
tions, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1185, 1193-94 (1990). The foundational article on the topic 
is considered to be Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1413 (1989). Other authors have also expounded on and criticized the doctrine in 
numerous contexts. See also Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term ­
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); John H. Garvey, The Powers and the Duties of Government, 26 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209 (1989); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem 
of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984). 
138. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine suffered a decline after Rust v. Sul­
livan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), in which the Court limited the reach of the doctrine in pro­
grams funding governmental speech. Despite the Court's limitation on the doctrine set 
in Rust, it was revitalized after the 2001 Term in which the Court applied the doctrine to 
the legal services program in Velazquez v. Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. 533 (2001). In 
that case, the Court held unconstitutional a restriction on legal services aid recipients' 
use of aid to attempt to amend or challenge welfare laws. Id. at 548-49. 
139. U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,114 (2001). 
140. Id. at 118 n.4. 
141. Brief for the Petitioner at 21-22, U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (No. 
00-1260), available at 2001 WL 799254 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 
385 (1994)). 
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Arguably, Wisconsin could respond that the correct compari­
son is not whether the government could have deprived Oakley of 
the right to procreate ifhe were a free man, but rather, whether the 
government could have deprived Oakley of the right to have chil­
dren if he were incarcerated. However, this position goes against 
the great weight of unconstitutional conditions cases, of which there 
are admittedly few, in the probation context.142 Moreover, it is in­
consistent with the general approach of the part of the doctrine that 
explains that simply because government can through one action 
restrict a liberty interest of an individual, it does not mean it can 
automatically do so in a different context just because the govern­
mental largess being offered in the second scenario can be catego­
rized somehow as lesser. As Kathleen Sullivan has explained, the 
unconstitutional conditions problem implicates the question 
whether the "greater power to deny a benefit [in Oakley's case pro­
bation] includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its 
receipt. "143 
Nevertheless, taking the point on directly arguendo, reveals the 
serious flaw in the Oakley outcome. Even if Wisconsin could be 
heard to argue that the correct point of comparison is whether the 
government could restrict Oakley's right to procreate as an incar­
cerated felon, the restriction on Oakley's right to procreate, without 
the legitimate penological concerns that arise in a prison context, 
would still fail. 
In Goodwin v. Turner,144 inmate Steven Goodwin requested 
authorization from prison officials to ejaculate into a container so 
that his semen could be used to impregnate his wife artificially.145 
142. See, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 118; U.S. v. Cranley, 350 F.3d 617, 620-22 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (no unconstitutional conditions problem where probationer required to give 
full accounting of his criminal activity as condition of probation); U.S. v. Jimenez, 600 
F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1979) (unconstitutional condition of probation to require re­
payment of cost of appointed counsel where no exception for indigence); State v. Ec­
cles, 877 P.2d 779, 800-02 (Ariz. 1994) (unconstitutional to require waiver of Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as condition of probation); State v. 
Franklin, 604 N.W.2d 79, 83-84 (Minn. 2000) (geographical exclusion held invalid under 
unconstitutional conditions review). 
143. Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1415. As many commentators have explained, 
this "greater includes the lesser" argument has run headlong into unconstitutional con­
ditions creating a confusing mix of case law. See, e.g., Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconsti­
tutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
371, 374 (1995) (noting that "[t]he problem of conditioned benefits is 'the basic struc­
tural issue that for over a hundred years has bedeviled court and commentators.''') 
(citation omitted). 
144. 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990). 
145. Id. at 1396. 
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Goodwin and his wife were concerned that if they were forced to 
wait until Goodwin's release date to begin to have children, they 
would be at an increased risk for giving birth to a child with birth 
defects "as a result of increased maternal age."146 Officials denied 
the request. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial 
of the inmate's request for relief.147 Despite this outcome, the 
court's analysis is informative for purposes of evaluating an uncon­
stitutional conditions argument on behalf of Oakley. 
In Goodwin, the Eighth Circuit assumed that Goodwin's right 
to procreate survives incarceration.148 The standard for evaluating 
the prison restriction on a prisoner's fundamental right, explained 
the court, is "to ask whether the regulation is 'reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.' "149 Finding that there were legiti­
mate penological interests that might be undermined by allowing 
male prisoners to procreate while in prison, the court upheld the 
restriction. ISO Although this outcome reveals the compromised na­
ture of the constitutional right to procreate while one is incarcer­
ated, the applicable rule reveals the limitations on the compromise. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 1400. 
148. The Ninth Circuit has taken a different approach. See Gerber v. Hickman, 
291 F.3d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (right to procreate does not survive incarcer­
ation) rev'g 264 F.3d 882. The Ninth Circuit panel decision affirming the inmate's right 
to procreate engendered a significant amount of scholarship, most of which argued that 
the decision was correctly decided and reversed the previous trend of striking prison 
regulations restricting the right of inmates to procreate as supported by legitimate pe­
nological interests. See, e.g., Jaime Escuder, Comment, Prisoner Parents: An Argument 
for Extending the Right to Procreate to Incarcerated Men and Women, 2002 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 271 (2002); Richard Guidice, Jr., Note, Procreation and the Prisoner: Does the 
Right to Procreate Survive Incarceration and do Legitimate Penological Interests Justify 
Restrictions on the Exercise of the Right, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2277 (2002). 
149. Goodwin, 908 F.2d at 1398 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 
(1990». 
150. Oddly, the legitimate penological interest that supported the restriction in 
the court's eyes was rooted in gender equity. The Eighth Circuit explained that if male 
prisoners' rights to procreate were protected, female prisoners' rights would also have 
to be. That would result in hardship for the prison because the method for protecting 
the procreative right would be so different, and labor intensive, in the instance of fe­
male prisoners. Id. at 1400. Evaluating the strength of the court's reasoning is beyond 
the scope of this essay. However, this author questions the legitimacy of the prison 
officials' concerns given the gender inequities in prison See, e.g., Voncile B. Gowdy, 
Women in Criminal Justice: A Twenty Year Update, available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/re­
ports/98Guides/wcjs98/execsumm.htm (last visited July 21, 2004) (noting that the "in­
crease in the number of female offenders has not been matched by enhanced attention 
to specialized programs geared particularly for women - such as medical care and coun­
seling for prior victimization from battering or sexual assault, health care, drug treat­
ment, and parenting skills training.") 
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That is, in order to justify the restriction on even a prisoner's consti­
tutional right to procreate, a prison must demonstrate that legiti­
mate penological interests support the restriction. Those 
penological interests that justify the restriction in the prison context 
simply do not transfer to the probationer context. Therefore, tak­
ing away legitimate prison-based penological interests from the 
analysis, a prisoner ends up with more rights than David Oakley 
does as a probationer. 
Deprived of the fundamental right to procreate solely because 
he is a probationer, Oakley ultimately enjoys fewer protections 
than he would as an incarcerated felon. Both logic and the uncon­
stitutional conditions doctrine decry this result. While it is true, as 
the Oakley court recognized, that Oakley might, as a practical mat­
ter, be deprived the right to procreate had the court simply sen­
tenced him to prison, that does not mean that he would have no 
legal recourse to challenge such a restriction on a fundamental lib­
erty and privacy interest. Nor does it mean, as a doctrinal matter, 
that the state could condition the benefit-probation as an alterna­
tive to incarceration - on his voluntary agreement to relinquish a 
constitutional right. 
CONCLUSION 
David Oakley did a bad thing. He should have financially sup­
ported his children. Few people, and certainly not this author, 
would quarrel with the Oakley court's concern for the welfare of 
children.lsl On the level of doctrine, the court balanced the com­
peting concerns and ruled that the state's interest in protecting chil­
dren defeated Oakley's right to procreate. The court acted in its 
traditional capacity and applied a straightforward rule of law. De­
spite that, the result conflicts with nearly all reported decisions in­
volving analogous facts. No matter, that is the messy business of 
judicial balancing. 
Of greater concern, however, is that in the end, the result puts 
Oakley in a worse position with respect to his right to procreate 
than he would have been in had he been ordered to the more se­
vere punishment, incarceration rather than probation. Moreover, 
the court justified the incursion on Oakley's constitutional right on 
the fact that he received the governmental benefit of probation. 
The precedent this sets threatens to undermine the constitutional 
151. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Wis. 2001) (describing the "effects of 
the nonpayment of child support on our children" as "particularly troubling."). 
108 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:81 
rights of marginalized people, including the poor and racial minori­
ties.152 In the end, society is harmed when constitutional rights are 
denied or conditioned on benefits. While the case may result in 
some ephemeral protections for David Oakley's yet unborn or, 
more likely, never-to-be-born children, the risk of harm to the con­
stitutionalliberties of existing citizens is far greater than that posed 
to potential ones. 
152. See Albiston & Neilson, supra note 14; Ballard, supra note 8, WILLIAMS, 
supra note 136. 
